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A large exclusion from the labor market or an important unemployment of low-skilled workers
is observed in some developed economies in which a minimum wage has been introduced. In such
circumstances, governments may adopt two kinds of policies. They may pay unemployment bene￿ts
or they may try to increase demand for low-skilled labor by subsidizing low-skilled jobs. In this
paper, we propose a matching model which allows to analyze the e￿ects of these policies on the
labor market. In our framework, the government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied
workers and classical and frictional unemployment simultaneously exist. The labor market is dual
featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Low-skilled jobs pay the minimum wage, while
high-skilled wages result from bargaining. Moreover, high-skilled unemployed can apply for both
types of jobs thereby accepting to be downgraded, while opportunities for low-skilled workers are
limited to low-skilled jobs. We ￿rst give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-
state equilibrium and we analyze the e￿ects of several ￿scal instruments. In this set-up, increasing
low-skilled job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment
spells. We provided empirical evidence by calibrating our model on French labor market data, it
is found that for ￿ve low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers
are downgraded (although they might have been previously unemployed).
Keywords: Crowding-out, Matching, On-the-job search, Taxation
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1 Introduction
Over the last ten years, some European countries facing a large unemployment have been implementing
a mixed policy in which massive transfers to the unemployed coexist with job subsidies. Before the
mid-1990s, they mainly used pure transfer policies to prevent income inequalities from rising. They
switched to a mixed policy because a job subsidy strategy may allow for distributive stability and since
it is less costly, given that people at work are supposed to produce something. This was the intuition of
the job subsidy strategy advocated by DrŁze and Malinvaud (1994) in their policy initiative for Europe,
in which they recommended to ￿nance massive low-skilled payroll tax cuts by shifting the tax burden
to skilled labor. Nonetheless, in presence of classical unemployment due to a minimum wage, changing
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1the ￿scal scheme may change the demand but also the size and composition of the labor force. In
presence of frictional unemployment in a dual labor market, increasing the ￿scal burden of high skilled
workers and jobs may induce changes in low-skilled and high-skilled worker job structure and in turn
may be detrimental for low-skilled people situation. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible
downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the e￿ectiveness of policies aiming at reducing
classical unemployment are decreasing. At the equilibrium, any additional classical unemployed re-
entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of downgraded high-skilled workers.
In practice, jobs can be characterized by the scope they o￿er for utilizing the worker capacities.
The technology is usually such that a low-skilled job can be done by either type of workers, but a high-
skilled job can only be done by a high-skilled worker. As Albrecht and Vroman (2002) put it, ￿a Ph.D.
in nuclear engineering can do rocket science or she can ￿ip hamburger. A high-school dropout can’t do
rocket science but she can ￿ip hamburger￿. Facing unemployment risk, some high skilled workers can
accept a job that does not correspond to their level of professional quali￿cation. For instance, Battu
et al. (2000) highlight that in Britain, eleven years after graduation only 70% of graduates have a job
requiring a degree. Following Hartog et al. (1994), almost 21% of high skilled workers have accepted
a low-skilled position on Dutch data. In an economy where matches between high-skilled workers
and low-skilled vacancies are mutually bene￿cial, high skilled workers take jobs away from low-skilled
workers. In other words, they crowd out low-skilled workers. 1 In such a situation, some people earning
the same income do not have the same opportunities due to their di￿erent quali￿cation.
Few papers discuss public policy within a dual market framework. Among them, Kleven and
Sorensen (2004) and Acemoglu (2001) focus on the impact of labor market regulation on the compo-
sition of employment. The e￿ects on the labor income distribution is explored by Lommerud et al.
(2004). In contrast with these contributions, we consider an economy where workers have di￿erent
skills and opportunities and in which the size of the labor force changes with the ￿scal scheme. This
relates our framework to papers by Cardullo and Van der Linden (2006), Pierrard (2005) and Batyra
and Sneessens (2006). This last paper for instance underlines that the presence of overquali￿ed workers
plays a signi￿cant role in the relative e￿ectiveness of low-skilled worker unemployment policies, but
does not consider the role of classical unemployment.
We introduce a search model ￿ la Pissarides that can be characterized by three key inputs : (i)
an ex-ante heterogeneity of skills in workers and jobs, we distinguish low- and high-skilled workers
and jobs; (ii) a productivity heterogeneity among low-skilled workers, (iii) a minimum wage for low-
skilled jobs and a high-skilled wage that results from bargaining. In this dual market, we consider a
situation in which classical and frictional unemployment coexist. Classical unemployment results from
an heterogeneity of skills among low-skilled workers and the assumption that employees in low-skilled
positions have very small negotiating power and are paid the minimum wage set by the government.
Low-skilled workers are therefore in a classical unemployment situation when their output is less than
the labor cost. Assuming the existence of informational asymmetries 2 and the presence of frictional
and classical unemployment, we illustrate the complex e￿ects of tax wages, employment subsidies and
unemployment bene￿ts on labor market equilibrium values3.
From a theoretical point of view, two kinds of equilibria can be observed in such a framework: on
1Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) ￿nd for example that the relative change in the employment fraction of workers
with a higher level of education in occupations for which only lower education is required is higher in regions with high
unemployment. They conclude then to a crowding out e￿ect which explains the cyclical property of the unemployment
rate of lower educated workers. Dolado et al. (2003) also ￿nd evidence of over-education and crowding-out e￿ect in
Europe. Finally Pierrard and Sneessens (2004) show for Belgium that the phenomenon of low skill unemployment is
jointly due to relative wage rigidities, an increase in the supply of skilled labour and job competition.
2These asymetries are due to the fact that the government does not know the real opportunities of individuals. See
also Hungerbuhler et al. (2003) which characterize optimal non linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum
of unobservable productivity level and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in labor market.
3In a simple model of equilibrium search with wage bargaining, Pissarides (1985) shows that lump-sum negative
tax wages and employment subsidies have both the same e￿ects on employment. Both ￿scal instruments reduce wages
and raise employment, by rising the surplus shared. However, this result does not apply when the wage is exogenously
determined, like in France. Lump-sum tax wage, employment subsidies and unemployment bene￿ts are then three
distinct instruments for government.
2the one hand, a segmented equilibrium in which high-skilled workers prefer to be unemployed rather
than to occupy low-skilled positions. On the other hand, a cross-match equilibrium in which they
prefer to be downgraded but continue to search for high-skilled positions 4. In practice, the second
situation is observed and we focus on it. In this set-up, e￿ciency of subsidy policy in favor of low-
skilled jobs depends on the distribution of the heterogeneous low-skilled worker productivity and the
nature of interactions on the low-skilled job market that can be decomposed into two e￿ects : A
productivity e￿ect and a competition e￿ect. The ￿rst one corresponds to the fact that, if we agree that
high-skilled workers are generally more productive than low-skilled ones, when low-skilled positions
are occupied by low-skilled and downgraded high-skilled workers, an increase in the probability of
￿nding a high-skilled job induces a change in the composition of skills in low-skill jobs which reduces
their average productivity. This negatively a￿ects the number of low-skilled positions (vacant or not)
and the probability of ￿nding them. The second one refers to the fact that a higher probability of
being employed in a high-skilled job implies a lower unemployment rate for high-skilled workers and a
smaller number of applicants to low-skilled jobs which a￿ects positively the probability of ￿nding a low-
skilled job. The two e￿ects interact and the overall result depends on the employment/unemployment
composition on job markets, the relative productivity of both types of workers and the level of taxes
and subsidies. For instance, a marginal increase in taxes levied on high skill jobs may induce a decrease
both in high-skilled and low-skilled jobs, or a substitution between them. In these circumstances, a
change in the ￿scal scheme can have non monotonous e￿ects according to the current situation and
the amplitude of the change.
Simultaneously increasing low-skilled job subsidies and high-skilled wage taxes to balance the bud-
get may then have a reduced, possibly negative, e￿ect on the probability to ￿nd a job for low-skilled
people. The more favorable outcome of such subsidy policies in terms of low-skilled unemployment is
obtained in case of a positive e￿ect on low-skilled job ￿rm pro￿ts and a substitution e￿ect of high-
skilled jobs by low-skilled ones. But under alternative circumstances, the outcome is ambiguous and
may be unfavorable to non-classical unemployed low-skilled workers. In fact, the subsidy policy widens
the interval of productivity that allows for positive pro￿ts. This has a double e￿ect: an increase in
the competition between workers in order to ￿nd a job and a reduction in the expected productivity of
low-skilled jobs. Subsidizing low skill jobs always diminishes classical unemployment, but at the cost
of a possibly increasing of the average unemployment duration for all low-skilled workers. Moreover
as subsidies get larger, reduction in low-skilled unemployment gets smaller and the number of down-
graded larger. This shift of high-skilled workers to less productive positions implies that minimum
unemployment and surplus maximization are incompatible in equilibrium.
This large number of high-skilled downgraded suggests that some European countries such as Bel-
gium or France may apparently pursue contradictory objectives when they simultaneously implement
active short term subsidy policies against low-skilled worker unemployment and promote policies for
productivity and education in the spirit of Lisbon European conference agenda. Nevertheless, it can
be noticed that the larger the high-skilled population, the less decreasing are the short term policy
returns. For example, a simple calibration on French data allows us to illustrate the above mechanisms
and the e￿ects of various changes in the ￿scal scheme. It appears that the level of subsidies in France
induces an equilibrium in which any low-skilled worker reentering the job market is accompanied by
0.4 high-skilled worker accepting to be downgraded and that the creation of four low-skilled jobs is
accompanied by the downgrading of one high-skilled worker. A possible caveat in this analysis is that
we do not consider all types of ￿scal reforms. We indeed do not model the motives of voluntary unem-
ployment that may be related to heterogeneous disutilities to work. We therefore restrict our attention
to changes in the ￿scal scheme that leave net taxes on low-skilled workers unchanged.
The paper proceeds as follows. The setup of the model is described in the second Section. The
equilibrium of the model is presented in the third one, where existence and uniqueness results are laid
out. In the fourth Section we study the properties of the equilibrium and illustrate the consequences
of various changes in the ￿scal scheme. The ￿fth one is devoted to a calibration exercise on the French
4See Gautier (2002), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Dolado et al. (2003) who consider a matching model of heteroge-
neous workers and jobs which includes on-the-job search for high-skilled people looking for a high-skilled job.
3economy. Further, the e￿ects of a biased technological progress are analyzed by simulating a change
in the productivity di￿erential. The last Section concludes.
2 The set-up
We draw from the continuous-time model introduced by Albrecht and Vroman (2002) or Gautier (2002).
We consider an economy consisting of a ￿xed labor force, modeled by a continuum of agents that can
be of two exclusive types of skill : low and high. Populations of low-skilled and high-skilled people
are respectively of mass φl and φh. Workers are in￿nitely lived and assumed to be risk-neutral. On
the other side of the labor market, the number of jobs is endogenous. For simplicity, we assume single
worker ￿rms, with either a simple (type l) or a complex (type h) job.
All applicants whatever their type low or high (l or h) can get a simple job, which needs no
special skill. The technology is such that when a simple job is ￿lled, the output produced is s, which is
distributed between low-skilled workers on the support [0,s]. Functions x(s) and X (s) are respectively
the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of s. In order to simplify the
analysis, all high-skilled workers are supposed to be homogeneous in term of productivity and produce
s when matching with a simple job5. At the opposite, a complex job (type h) requires a minimum skill
to be productive and employers observe worker’s skill when the wage bargaining starts. The output
of a complex job is sh, when the skill of worker is type h, and 0 otherwise. Consequently, low-skilled
workers do not apply for complex jobs.





i ,λi > 0 ,0 < σi < 1 for i = l,h
where zi denotes the mass of workers who applied and vi the mass of vacancies. The probability that
an unemployed worker moves into a job i is then given by pi = λi (vi/zi)
σi, and the probability that a
vacancy of type i is ￿lled, is qi = λi (zi/vi)
1−σi. The relation between those probabilities writes




i for i = l,h (1)
Jobs end at the exogenous ￿ow rate δj, j = l,h. In this case, the ￿rm becomes an un￿lled vacancy
and the worker becomes unemployed.
The rates at which workers ￿nd jobs are endogenous and depend not only as usual on the level
of unemployment, but also on the composition of unemployment. In fact, while bargaining with a
simple job supplier, a high-skilled worker may look for complex vacancies. When they accept to be
downgraded, high-skilled workers impose an externality on low-skilled workers.
Real wage in the low-skilled positions is a minimum wage ￿xed exogenously at w by the government.
We assume it smaller than ¯ s, so that the productivity of high-skilled workers always cover labor cost.
Nevertheless, since the support of the productivity s of low-skilled workers is [0, ¯ s], the minimum wage
leaves room for classical unemployment and frictions are not the only source of unemployment in this
set-up. On the other hand, we assume that employees in low-skilled positions have little negotiating
power and are paid the minimum wage that is set by the government at a level that ensures their
accepting the jobs.
Real wages in the high-skilled sector are determined by a generalized Nash bargaining process that
takes place between the individual worker and the ￿rm, after they meet. β is associated to high-skilled
worker negotiation power. To keep the model tractable, we make the two following assumptions. (i)
Search is not observable. Wolinsky (1987) and more recently Abbring (1999) show that this guarantees
that workers and ￿rms will not continue searching for similar partners during the bargaining. (ii)
Following Gautier (2002), the wage is renegotiation proof, which implies that wages at complex jobs
5The main results remain unchanged if we assume some productivity heterogeneity among high-skilled workers when
matching with a simple job as long as the distribution ￿rst-order dominates the low-skilled one.
4are independent of the workers previous labor market state.6 Under these assumptions, ￿rms and
workers negotiate a real wage wh which at the steady state remains constant until the job is broken
up by the exogenous process assumed above.
Furthermore, we introduce a set of taxes, subsidies and bene￿ts related to the labor market. Un-
employed people receive at each period a bene￿t denoted by b. For the high-skilled workers, their
wages resulting from a negotiation process, we consider a net lump-sum wage tax τh. On the contrary,
low-skilled worker wage being exogenously ￿xed, we consider a lump-sum wage tax τl paid by any
worker who holds a low-skilled position and a low-skilled job tax κl paid by the ￿rm (both taxes can
be negative). The government cannot discriminate low-skilled and high-skilled workers when they are
matched with simple jobs. No information can be obtained with the observation of wages. Conse-
quently, the government has to subsidy in the same way all simple jobs. We focus on self-￿nancing
schemes, once taken into account a ￿xed public good spending (G).
At last, when posting a vacancy, ￿rms face ￿xed costs cl and ch, for simple and complex jobs
respectively. They can be viewed as advertising costs. There is a free entry condition for both types
of vacancies, so that, any vacancy should expect a zero expected pro￿t at equilibrium.
We focus on equilibria in which it is bene￿cial for high-skilled workers to match with simple vacan-
cies and we refer to this type as an equilibrium with cross-matching. We now write the basic Bellman
equations of the model at a stationary equilibria. We do not study the path, if it exists, between two
stationary equilibria related to the two sets of government instruments. This must be kept in mind, in
particular regarding the interpretation of the static comparative exercises we perform in the sequel.
The discounted value of a ￿lled j job with a worker of type i is denoted by Jij whereas the discounted
value of a vacancy of type j is denoted by Vj. The discounted value of a ￿lled complex job satis￿es
rJhh = sh − wh − δh (Jhh − Vh) (2)
where r is the instantaneous discount rate and wh is the wage paid by ￿rms with complex jobs.
The value of a ￿lled simple job depends on the productivity of the worker and on his opportunities.
If the simple job is matched with a high-skilled worker, the value when ￿lled is
rJhl = ¯ s − κl − w − (δl + ph)(Jhl − Vl) (3)
assuming that employers with ￿lled simple jobs pay a tax κl. This equation takes into account the
fact that a high-skilled worker continues to search for a complex job, and so, may quit at any moment.
If a simple job is matched with a low-skilled worker, the value of the job depends on the worker’s
productivity s
rJll (s) = s − κl − w − δl (Jll (s) − Vl) (4)
Of course, a ￿rm endowed with a simple job, matched with a low-skilled worker, accept to ￿ll the post
when surplus Jll (s) − Vl is non negative. At equilibrium, by the free-entry condition, the value of the
vacancy is null. Therefore, there exists a productivity threshold, s = κl +w, under which ￿rms do not
accept to ￿ll their jobs. In the following, we assume that low-skilled workers that have productivity
lower than s, internalize the fact that they are excluded from the job market. So doing, they no longer
apply for simple jobs and constitute classical unemployment.
At the moment the vacancy is opened, employers posting a simple job do not know the type of
worker they will meet. But they know the aggregate composition of unemployment and therefore
can calculate the probability of meeting each of the worker type, taking into account the fact that
low-skilled workers with productivity lower than s will not search for a job. We denote by uh the
unemployment level of high-skilled workers and by ul (s) the unemployment level of low-skilled workers
with productivity s. Since we assume that it is pro￿table to high-skilled workers to accept low-skilled
6As Gautier (2002) explains, the intuition is the following. If an employed worker would use his simple-job-wage as
threat point in the bargaining, ￿rms would initially agree but then re-open the bargaining at the moment the worker
actually quits. In the new bargaining, the worker’s outside option is similar to the outside option of an unemployed
worker.
5positions, we have
rVl = −cl + ql
 R ¯ s
s ul (s)Jll (s)ds + uhJhl
R ¯ s




where cl is a ￿xed cost paid by ￿rms when posting a vacancy for a simple job. It can be viewed as an
advertising cost. At last, for complex jobs,
rVh = −ch + qh (Jhh − Vh) (6)
where ch is the ￿xed cost paid by ￿rms which o￿er complex jobs.
We now turn to workers’ discounted values. The low-skilled workers which are below the threshold




l = b (7)
For other workers, let Ui and Nij be respectively the discounted values of being unemployed and
employed, where i = l,h denotes the skill of the worker, and j = l,h the type of the job. At steady
state, Ul satis￿es
rUl = b + pl(Nll − Ul) (8)
Since the minimum wage applies to all simple jobs, the discounted values Nll and Ul do not depend
on the productivity s of the worker under consideration.7
When accepting a low-skilled job is pro￿table, the discounted value of being unemployed for a
high-skilled individual satis￿es
rUh = b + pl(Nhl − Uh) + ph(Nhh − Uh) (9)
In the low-skilled sector, discounted value of a low-skilled employed worker writes
rNll = w − τl − δl (Nll − Ul) (10)
and, assuming that Nhh is always at least as large as Nhl, we get
rNhh = wh − τh − δh (Nhh − Uh) (11)
Discounted value of simple job for a high-skilled worker satis￿es 8
rNhl = w − τl − δl (Nhl − Uh) + ph (Nhh − Nhl) (13)
7Note that, in this model, the search cost is null. Then, people are indi￿erent between staying at home or searching
without success. We consider in this case that, knowing the fact that they cannot be successful in their search on the
job market, they do not search, and, then, do not increase job market frictions. With positive search cost, equation (8)
should be rewritten as
rUl = b − cr + pl(Nll − Ul).
and a low-skilled unemployed which can potentially ￿nd a job may be incited to mimic an excluded one. pl being
endogenous, we have to face an indeterminacy of the equilibrium. The equilibrium depends on the belief of each agent
on the behavior of the others and winds up with a coordination problem between low-skilled workers. Keeping to a
simple analysis that enhances the consequences of interactions between the two sources of unemployment, we assume
that cr = 0.
8A possible extension would be to introduce some disutility of being downgraded for a high-skilled worker, by adding
a constant ρhl (ρhl ≥ 0) in the expression of the discounted value of a simple job for a high-skilled worker
rNhl = w − τl − ρhl − δl (Nhl − Uh) + ph (Nhh − Nhl) (12)
The parameter ρhl would represent the fact that a wage relation encompasses an economic and social relation, and that
the social status procured by a job is not the least important aspect of the wage relation (see for instance on this subject
Solow (1990)). Introducing disutility of being downgraded could sharply modify the nature of the equilibrium since
high-skilled workers may be willing to only apply for complex jobs, whereas low-skilled workers apply to low-skilled jobs,
leading to ex-post segmentation.




















Figure 1 summarizes the ￿ows of job creation and destruction involved in the modeling.
Finally, the wage rate negotiated after the Nash bargain may be derived from the maximization of
the function:
[Nhh − Uh]
β [Jhh − Vh]
1−β
which implies,
β (Jhh − Vh) = (1 − β)(Nhh − Uh) (14)
3 De￿nition and existence of equilibrium
We focus on cross-matching equilibria such that
Nll ≥ Ul Nhh ≥ Nhl ≥ Uh (15)
So doing, we exclude equilibria where low and high-skilled workers choose to remain unemployed,
despite their productivity parameter is high enough for being hired. Similarly, we do not consider
situations where ￿scal incentives lead high-skilled workers to prefer to work in simple jobs rather than
complex jobs, and continue to apply for simple jobs when they are matched with a complex one. As
the following lemma states, inequalities Nll ≥ Ul and Nhl ≥ Uh depends crucially on ￿scal instruments
Lemma 1 High-skilled workers and low-skilled workers apply for simple jobs if and only if τl +b ≤ w.
Proof. From equations (8), (9), (10) and (13), we have
Nhl − Uh =
w − τl − b
r + δl + pl + ph
and
Nll − Ul =
w − τl − b
r + δl + pl
that leads to the result.
7From Bellman equations, straightforward calculations show that the equilibrium values of arrival
rates, high-skilled wage, unemployment levels and employment levels only depend on κl, τl + b and











ell (s)ds + ehl)(τl + κl) + ehhτh
where G represents government spending, φlX (s) is the mass of excluded workers, ul (s) and ell (s)
are unemployment and employment levels of type-s low-skilled workers, uh is unemployment level of
high-skilled workers and ehj is their employment level in type-j jobs. Indeed, rewriting this constraint
as
(φl + φh)b = (
Z ¯ s
s
ell (s)ds + ehl)(τl + b + κl) + ehh (τh + b) − G (16)
allows us to compute the equilibrium level of b that corresponds to particular values of κl, τl + b and
τh + b. Then, one obtains the taxes levels τl and τh by subtracting b to the levels of τl + b and τh + b
chosen by the government. We summarize this process in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The government announces instruments values (τl,τh,b,κl) such that τl + b ≤ w,
τh + b < sh, κl < ¯ s − w and satisfying the government budget constraint for equilibrium values of
unemployment and employment levels.
An important characteristic of our setup is that the structure of unemployment matters for the
determination of equilibrium arrival rates. Indeed, a high-skilled worker may leave a simple job at
any time if he is matched with a complex one. Thus, the separation rate of a high-skilled worker is
δl + ph, while the separation rate of a low skilled one is always δl. Then, a simple job ￿lled with
a high-skilled worker has a lower value than a simple job ￿lled with a low-skilled worker with the
same productivity, i.e. ¯ s. Moreover, the expected value of vacant simple jobs is also a￿ected by the
distribution of productivity among low-skilled unemployed. The more they are concentrated around
¯ s, the larger this expected value will be. Consequently, equilibrium arrival rates and unemployment
levels are determined simultaneously.
De￿nition 1 Given (τl,τh,b,κl) satisfying Assumption 1, a steady-state equilibrium consists of non-
negative arrival rates (pi,qi)i∈{l,h}, workers and job values (Ui,Vi)i∈{l,h}, (Na,Ja)a∈{ll,hl,hh}, high-skilled
wages wh and unemployment levels (ul (s))s∈[s,¯ s] and uhcharacterized by
• Bellman equations for ￿rms (2), (3), (4), (5), (6),
• Bellman equations for workers (8), (9), (10), (11), (13),
• wage bargaining equation (14),
• unemployment levels resulting from ￿ow equilibria (see Appendix B)
ul (s) = φlx(s)
δl
δl + pl




δl + ph + pl
,
and satisfying the inequality Nhh ≥ Nhl.
We ￿rst state the range of values of the arrival rate ph that correspond to positive arrival rate pl
and that satisfy Nhh ≥ Nhl ≥ Uh. We need the following assumption.
Assumption 2 Instruments values (τl,τh) and parameters satisfy either (i) sh − τh < w − τl and
r + δh ≤ β(r + δl) or (ii) sh − τh ≥ w − τl.
8Proposition 1 Let (τl,τh,b,κl) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. If a steady-state equilibrium exists,






h and ¯ ph are de￿ned by
the following inequalities
(sh − τh − b) − (w − τl − b) ≤
(r + δh + βph)ch
(1 − β)Qh(ph)
≤ sh − τh − b (17)
(r + δh − β(r + δl))ch
(1 − β)Qh(ph)
≤ (sh − τh − b) − (w − τl − b) (18)
ph ≥ 0 (19)
Proof. From (2), (6), (9), (11), (13) and (14) and the free-entry condition Vh = 0, we get
(r + δh + βph)
ch
(1 − β)qh
= (sh − τh − b) −
pl
r + δl + pl + ph
(w − τl − b) (20)
If w = τl +b, this equation determines ph which satis￿es inequalities (17), (18) and (19). If w > τl +b,
equation (20) can be rewritten as
pl = Pl (ph,τl + b,τh + b)
≡ (r + δl + ph)




(1−β)Qh(ph) − [(sh − τh − b) − (w − τl − b)]
(21)
For positive ph, the arrival rate for low-skilled workers pl is positive if the numerator and the denomi-
nator in Pl are both positive. This leads to inequality (17).
Moreover, from equations (2), (6), (9), (11), (13) and (14) and the free-entry condition Vh = 0, the
condition Nhh ≥ Nhl is equivalent to
β (r + δl + pl + ph)
sh − τh − b
w − τl − b
≥ (r + δh + β (pl + ph))
which, replacing pl by the expression of Pl, leads to inequality (18). To conclude the proof, one has to
notice that the combination of the inequalities (17), (18) and (19) de￿ne a convex interval of values of
ph.
Boundaries p
h and ¯ ph are not always de￿ned by the same inequality. This depends on the sign of
r+δh−β(r+δl) and (sh−τh)−(w−τl). The case {sh − τh < w − τl and r + δh − β(r + δl) > 0} leads
to an empty interval, since inequality (18) would never be satis￿ed. In any other case, the interval
[p
h, ¯ ph] is non-empty (details are given in appendix B).














which is equivalent to
Ql(pl)


























s − κl − w
¯ s − κl − w
x(s)ds
1 − X (κl + w)
< 1.
9Notice that B (κl) = 1, if all low-skilled workers have productivity ¯ s.
If τl + b = w, then the arrival rate ph is the solution of equation (20) and pl is the unique positive
solution of equation (22) (since the LHS is decreasing from +∞ to −cl/(sl − κl − w) when pl increases
from 0 to +∞).
Now, if τl + b < w, equation (22) rewrites, using (21),
H (ph,κl,τl + b,τh + b) = 0.
In general, there may exist zero or more than one equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is possible to state con-
ditions for existence and uniqueness. We proceed in two steps. First, we state existence and uniqueness
when the productivity parameter is ¯ s for all low-skilled workers. Second, we release this assumption
and give conditions for existence and uniqueness when s is distributed on [0, ¯ s] according to the density
function x(s). In the ￿rst case, we have B (κl) = 1, while, in the second case B (κl) < 1.
Proposition 2 Let (τl,τh,b,κl) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose that the productivity param-
eter is ¯ s for all low-skilled workers (B (κl) = 1). If
σl + σh ≤ 1 and δl ≥ δh, (23)









h,κl,τl + b,τh + b

< 0 (24)
then there exists a unique cross-matching equilibrium in which the arrival rate for high-skilled workers
is denoted p∗
h.
Proof. Existence directly results from (24) and uniqueness is a consequence of Lemma 2 in Appendix
B.
Proposition 3 Let (τl,τh,b,κl) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose that conditions (23) and
(24) in Proposition 2 hold. If
B (κl) >
r + δl
r + δl + p∗
h
, for all κl ∈ [−w, ¯ s − w], (25)
then there exists a unique cross-matching equilibrium. Moreover, ph increases with respect to τl+b and
κl and decreases with respect to τh + b.
Proof. Note that H (ph,κl,τl + b,τh + b) shifts downward when B (κl) diminishes. By consequence,





We proceed by stating that, under this condition,
B (κl) >
r + δl
r + δl + ph
which implies ∂H
∂ph > 0 and thus that the equilibrium is unique. Since H is shifted downward, the new








r + δl + ph
which states uniqueness.
Moreover Pl (ph,τl + b,τh + b) is increasing (decreasing) with respect to its second (third) argument.
Since, an increase in pl has a negative e￿ect on the LHS in (22), the function H is increasing (decreasing)
with respect to τl + b (resp. τh + b ). Finally, H is decreasing with respect to κl. This concludes the
proof.
104 Equilibrium properties


































(¯ s − κl − w)
r + δl
The level ps
l (κl) corresponds to the arrival rate of simple jobs if no high-skilled worker were posting
for a low-skilled job. For a given arrival rate ph, we obtain a polynomial of degree two in pl whose
solutions are given in Appendix. We select the solution pc












and is positive. It is a continuous function such that limph→∞ pc
l,l (ph) = ps
l (κl). We plot this relation
between pl and ph in Figure 2 (low-skilled job market curve). On the other hand from (21), we have
pc
l,h (ph) =
(r + δl + ph)









− [(sh − τh − b) − (w − τl − b)]
(27)
which is a decreasing function of ph that is positive for p
h < ph < ph expression of which are given in
Appendix. We also plot this relation in Figure 2 (high-skilled job market curve).
The steady-state equilibrium corresponds in Figure 2 to the intersection of the curves (1) and (2)
that respectively represent the free-entry conditions in the high-skilled sector and in the low-skilled one.
In Figure 2, the two curves intersect at E in the decreasing part of the low-skilled curve. In this sense,
ph and pl can be viewed as ￿substitutes￿. A small shift of the high-skilled curve implies an opposite
sign change in the two categories. Conversely, in an economy where the two curves intersect in E’ on
the increasing part of the low-skilled curve ((1’) and (2)), ph and pl can be viewed as ￿complementary￿.
Consequently, a small increase in ph can be associated to an increase in pl. Interactions between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers on low-skilled job market allow to explain the U-shape of the free-entry
condition on this market. On the one hand, an increase in ph enhances the probability for high-skilled
workers to ￿nd more suitable job for them. Consequently, job turnover of simple jobs increases, which
leads to a decrease in the average value of ￿lled simple job. This e￿ect, that we call the productivity
e￿ect, reduces pl. On the other hand, an increase in ph reduces high-skilled workers unemployment
spell. Increasing ph modi￿es consequently the aggregate composition of unemployed workers. The
probability of hiring a high-skilled worker decreases for simple jobs. The simple job market moves
closer to the segmented equilibrium, where only low-skilled workers look for simple jobs. This e￿ect,
that we call the competition e￿ect, increases pl. When ph is initially relatively high, the unemployment
rate is very low for high-skilled people, the competition e￿ect dominates, while for low values of ph, the
productivity e￿ect dominates. In Figure 2, we have plotted the frontier (3) between complementarity
and substituability regimes.
We now turn to the e￿ect of the ￿scal instruments (κl,τl,τh,b). They work di￿erently on the
two free-entry conditions. The low-skilled job tax κl a￿ects only the position of the low-skilled curve,
whereas other instruments a￿ect the high-skilled curve.
A marginal increase in b enhances the outside opportunity of high-skilled workers in the wage
bargaining. This leads to a rise in wh and, consequently, a fall in the mass of complex jobs through the






















12free-entry condition. We then observe a decrease in ph. Depending on whether the initial level of ph
belongs to the complementarity or substituability regime, the resulting e￿ect on pl may be respectively
negative or positive. An increase in the tax τh is shared between the ￿rm and the workers because of
the wage bargaining. Here again, the wage wh increases and one observes the same qualitative changes
in ph and pl. An increase in τl has also no e￿ect on the low-skilled curve, since there is no bargaining
on simple jobs. Nevertheless, a higher tax τl means that low-skilled jobs become less attractive for
high-skilled workers, weakening their outside opportunity in the wage bargaining on wh. This results
in a higher arrival rate ph.
Let us now turn to a decrease in κl, the policy that we focus on. For a given ph, this may have
contradictory e￿ects on low-skilled unemployment. The fall in κl reduces the cost of simple jobs. It
contributes positively to pro￿ts generated by these jobs, which tends to increase the number of low-
skilled job ￿rms and a￿ects positively pl. This allows unemployed high-skilled workers to ￿nd some
downgraded positions. Simultaneously, it lowers the productivity threshold of positive pro￿t. This
implies that some low-skilled workers can re-enter the job market. Classical unemployment will then
be reduced. But the widening of the interval of productivity that allows for positive pro￿ts also has a
double e￿ect: an increase in the competition between workers in order to ￿nd a job and a reduction in
the expected productivity of low-skilled jobs. Both e￿ects decrease pl and contradict the ￿rst e￿ect.
Summarizing these results, a decrease in κl allows for a reduction in classical unemployment and has
an ambiguous e￿ect on pl, i.e. the average duration of low-skilled vacancies and of low-skilled frictional
unemployment. Graphically, the ambiguous e￿ect on pl means that the low-skilled curve may shift
upward or downward depending on the relative importance of the contradictory e￿ects.
From the above discussion, when the change in pl is positive, we wind up with a decrease in
low-skilled unemployment. When negative, the average decrease in low-skilled job productivity may
induce an increase in the frictional low-skilled unemployment (ul,f) that may dominate the reduction of
classical unemployment (ul,c). But if the fall in average low-skilled job productivity remains moderate,
the decrease in κl would result in an decrease in pl, allowing nevertheless for a lower low-skilled
unemployment ul,c + ul,f. This would be associated to longer frictional unemployment spells.
The consequences of the above mechanisms on ph when, for instance, pl increases are quite simple:
change in ph is negative since high-skilled workers have now a better outside opportunity and can claim
for higher wages wh. Notice that the fall in ph, in turn, increases the number of downgraded high-
skilled workers (see equations (29) in Appendix B) and contributes to a higher average productivity of
low-skilled jobs.
We are now able to describe the consequences of balanced-budget ￿scal policies that consist in
subsidizing low-skilled jobs. We only focus on a ￿nancing scheme that amounts to an increase in
taxes on high-skilled jobs τh. Reducing unemployment bene￿ts b is an alternative scheme we do not
consider because it can a￿ect voluntary unemployment we do not model. Such policies imply shifts of
the two free-entry conditions. Let us assume that a fall in κl shifts upward the free-entry condition
for low-skilled jobs and increases the arrival rate pl for any given value of ph, as plotted in Figure 3.
The direct consequence of the upward shift of the low-skilled free-entry condition is to increase pl and
reduce ph. Therefore, the number of ￿lled simple jobs ell+ehl rises, while the number of ￿lled complex
jobs ehh falls (see equations (29) in Appendix B). The overall decreasing number of unemployed people
reduces the burden of unemployment bene￿ts but this may not o￿set the cost of the subsidy policy that
applied to every low-skilled position. This may lead to some budget de￿cit that can be compensated
by an increase in τh. Combining Figures 2 and 3, we can picture the situation in which resources that
￿nance the subsidy are levied through an increase in the tax on high-skilled jobs τh. The change in
τh shifts the high-skilled free-entry condition to the left, leading to a lower arrival rate on high-skilled
job ph. Increasing high-skilled job taxes a￿ects negatively the number of high-skilled jobs. Due to
high-skilled worker bargaining power, tax increase is shared between the ￿rms and the workers. This
increases the frictional high-skilled worker unemployment and the burden of unemployment bene￿ts.
This e￿ect is nevertheless limited by an increase in the downgraded high-skilled workers. In some
circumstances, these additional downgraded high-skilled workers may even outnumber the high-skilled
job destructions leading to a decrease in high-skilled unemployment. This change in the probability
13of ￿nding a high-skilled job can induce a negative change in the number of low-skilled jobs when
current equilibrium position is in the complementarity zone or a positive change in the alternative
zone. The indirect e￿ect on pl is positive or negative. We end up with three schematic situations that
are presented in Figures 4, 5 and 6. In Figure 4, the substituability e￿ect reinforces the consequences
of the subsidy policy on the probability of ￿nding a low-skilled position. On the contrary, in Figures 5
and 6, the complementary e￿ect plays against the subsidy policy. It reduces its e￿ects in Figure 5 and
can o￿set them in Figure 6 for some well-chosen parameter values. Unemployed high-skilled workers
and re-entered low-skilled workers swell the ranks of people looking for a low-skilled position. This
increases frictional unemployment on the low-skilled job market and a￿ects more or less negatively the
probability of ￿nding a low-skilled position.
5 An example: The French economy
5.1 Calibration
As illustrated in the preceding section, in the set-up we have introduced, changes in low-skilled job
subsidies can have very di￿erent consequences on the changes in low-skilled unemployment. They may
reduce or increase it and when they reduce it, they can imply longer unemployment spells. In practice,
it is of interest to determine in which situation we stand. We propose to illustrate this issue with a
simple calibration in the case of the French economy.
Our model is characterized by a large number of parameters but cannot capture the complexity of
institutions in a developed economy. The illustrative calibration exercise we carry out on French data
likewise relies on an oversimpli￿ed representation of this economy and its institutions. In the sequel,
we only consider jobs in market activities. The population under study is therefore composed of the
working population minus civil servants plus those out of the working population who bene￿t from the
minimum welfare payment given to those who are not entitled to unemployment bene￿t (￿R.M.I￿). We
improperly use the expression ￿labor force￿ to refer to this population of 19.3 millions, 3.9 millions of
unemployed people included9.
We are ￿rst led to raise the issue of the de￿nition of skilled and unskilled persons. We cannot
uniquely de￿ne these classes from the last academic degree got by the persons as in numerous situations
(particularly for the older persons), there exists a gap between the last degree and the skills required
to hold the position declared by the ￿rms or the employees. Following Burnod and Chenu (2001),
we consider as skilled employees, persons that hold a position in which is used his/her professional
know-how acquired by educational or professional training. We thus construct our two classes on
the basis of the professional position (or the last position for the unemployed ones) as described in
Burnod and Chenu (2001) and the last degree, both declared in INSEE Employment Survey. If their
last degree is a A-level or corresponds to a college training and they hold a high-skilled professional
position, they are considered as high-skilled person. For those who are unemployed and have never
worked, we only use the last academic degree. Unskilled persons are mainly unskilled workers and
clerks (o￿ce clerks, sales clerks, janitors, night watchmen,...) without any degree or a degree less than
a A-level. In 1998 according to INSEE Employment survey, they accounted for 36.2 of the labor force
(φl = 0.362). Based on this classi￿cation, the survey allows us to compute the rate of unemployment
for each class and the share-out between high-skilled and low-skilled employment and unemployment,
we get : ehh = 0.547, ehl = 0.029 and ell = 0.222, uh = 0.062 and ul = 0.139. For sake of simplicity, we
assume that voluntary unemployment is only composed of low-skilled persons, so that this last ￿gure
has to be broken down into voluntary (ul,v), classical (ul,c) and friction unemployment (ul,f). We
assume that low-skilled productivities are distributed in [0,s] according to a Beta(a1,a2) distribution,
where a1 and a2 are two real positive numbers. Depending on the values of these parameters, this
distribution can have no mode or a mode between 0 and s.
9Our de￿nition of unemployed people doesn’t match voluntarily the ILO’s de￿nition, in order to take into account
the classic unemployed, which could be momentarily discouraged.







































15Table 1: Calibrated parameters
parameters φl β r σ δh δl
calibrated values 0.362 0.25 0.05 0.5 0.1791 0.2341
parameters b τl τh κl G wh
calibrated values 0.34 0.0227 0.143 -0.0218 0.0098 1.39
parameters sh s a1 a2 ml mh ul,c
calibrated values 1.7632 1.608 4.048 0.696 1.793 1.5133 0.0269
We then use administrative data sets (DADS) to measure the median monthly wage cost of low-
skilled and high-skilled workers declared by ￿rms. The above model focus on a limited number of
questions. In particular, pension, health and family contributions and bene￿ts are overlooked and there
are not retirees and children. We keep to this simpli￿ed approach and consider that these contributions
are equal to the bene￿ts over a life-cycle. We present all the details of the calibration in Appendix
C. Table 1 gives the values we end up with. For such a set of parameters, Figure 7 illustrates that
there exists a unique mixed equilibrium. The distribution of low-skilled worker productivity is given
in Figure 8. It is characterized by a mode in s and suggests a continuous distribution of productivities
over low- and high-skilled workers.
From the calibration exercise, we ￿rst can notice that the probability of ￿nding a job for low-
skilled workers is closed to the lowest value. The frictional unemployment and then, the waiting time
in unemployment is consequently very large for low-skilled people. There is then a large room for
maneuver for ￿scal policies in order to decrease the delay for ￿nding a job. Moreover, the equilibrium
is closed to the frontier between the substitution and complementarity zones, which a￿ects the design
of optimal labor market policies. When limiting our attention to equilibrium positions, a change in
a ￿scal instrument can have non monotonous e￿ect on pl depending on the amplitude of the shift of
the curves it implies. A small increase in τh may induce a decrease in the equilibrium value of pl but
a larger one may have the opposite e￿ect. Second, the simple-job-￿rm free-entry curve is ￿at around
the equilibrium position. Large changes in the ￿scal schemes are necessary to get a signi￿cant change
in pl.
5.2 Study of low-skilled payroll tax cuts ￿nanced by an increase of tax burden on
high-skilled labor
5.2.1 Empirical illustration
From the calibration exercise, we conclude that we are in situation 2 (cf. Figure 5). A balanced
low-skilled tax cut policy leads to a proportional small decrease of high-skilled job rate, and a more
important increase of low-skilled job rate. It is interesting to note that as we are close to the frontier,
such a policy may lead to a shift of the curve that entails a crossing in the substitution zone. In
this zone, the favorable impact of this policy for low-skilled job rate is more accurate than in the
complementarity one (cf. Figure 4).
In Figure 9, we illustrate the change in the equilibrium values when the low-skilled job subsidy is
modi￿ed and the government budget is balanced by an appropriate increase in the high-skilled wage
taxes, unemployment bene￿ts are unchanged to not a￿ect voluntary unemployment. In the ￿rst plot,
we observe that the high-skilled wage tax rate decreases with κl, but additional computations show
16Figure 7: Equilibrium























Figure 8: Low-skilled worker productivity distribution
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17that for larger values of κl, it increases. When low-skilled jobs are signi￿cantly taxed, the implied
increase in unemployment and associated unemployment bene￿ts necessitates larger net taxes on high-
skilled workers. This echoes a "La￿er"-type property. When κ decreases, low-skilled unemployment
(classical and frictional) decreases and the number of downgraded high-skilled workers increases as due
to higher net taxes on high-skilled jobs. This increase is nevertheless accompanied by a decreasing
number of high-skilled unemployed, downgraded high-skilled workers outnumbering the high-skilled
job destructions.
In presence of classical and frictional unemployment, the e￿ects of low-skilled job subsidy policy get
smaller as the subsidies increase. Classical unemployment is reduced and in our calibration exercise,
frictional one decreases, but average productivity tends to decrease. The decreasing amplitude of
consequences of low-skilled job subsidy policy is illustrated in Figures 10, 11 and 12.
Figure 10 illustrates that a 1% increase in subsidy is never self-￿nanced by the implied decrease in
unemployment bene￿ts, but requires a larger and larger increase in high-skilled job tax to balance the
budget. We can notice that this result is obtained despite that we observe a simultaneous reduction
of high-skilled employment and high-skilled unemployment (Fig. 11).
As subsidies get larger, a marginal increase in subsidies induces a smaller decrease in classical un-
employment and a larger increase in the number of downgraded high-skilled workers. This is illustrated
in Figure 12 by the ratios of the marginal change in the number of downgraded high-skilled workers
over, on the one hand, that in the number of low-skilled workers who leave classical unemployment and
on the other hand, that in the number of low-skilled job creations. From our calibration, the level of
subsidies in France induces an equilibrium in which any low-skilled worker reentering the job market
is accompanied by 0.4 high-skilled worker accepting to be downgraded (Fig. 12). Similarly, we observe
that the creation of four low-skilled jobs is accompanied by the downgrading of one high-skilled worker.
Shift of high-skilled workers to low-skilled jobs implies that equilibrium with minimum unemploy-
ment does not correspond to that induced by the maximization of an utilitarian criterion.
5.2.2 Normative properties
In order to evaluate simple-jobs subsidy policy, we consider the traditional utilitarian criterion, de￿ned
as the sum of individual utilities. Recalling that steady state intertemporal utility of an excluded
worker is b/r, the utilitarian criterion writes
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Let us rewrite this equation in terms of ￿ows of income:
rW = (φl + φh)b + φl (1 − X (w
￿








r(Nll − Ul) + ehlr(Nhl − Uh) + ehhr(Nhh − Uh)
and, from equations (8) and (9), we deduce
rW = (φl + φh)b +

φl (1 − X (w
￿








+[φh (pl + ph) + r(ehl + ehh)](Nhl − Uh) + (φhph + ehhr)(Nhh − Nhl) (28)
At steady-state, rW is the total ￿ow of income distributed among workers. Equation (28) presents a
decomposition of this total ￿ow. The ￿rst term (φl + φh)b represents the fact that anyone can expect
to receive at least the minimum income b. The three other terms represent the expected ￿ows of
income that workers will receive as far as they are not excluded. First, there is the expected ￿ow of
18Figure 9: Changes in equilibrium values with κ when b is given and τh ensures government budget
balance
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19Figure 10: A marginal change in low-skilled job subsidies induces...





























































resulting marginal change in taxes at equilibrium
Figure 11: A marginal change in low-skilled job subsidies induces...









4 Change in unemployment structure
kappa
marginal change in classical unemployment
marginal change in low-skilled frictional unemployment
marginal change in high-skilled unemployment
20Figure 12: A marginal change in low-skilled job subsidies induces...








Change in employment structure
kappa
ratio of marginal changes : downgraded over low-skilled workers
ratio of marginal changes (in absolute value) : downgraded over
low-skilled workers from classical unemployment
income for an unskilled worker to have a productivity parameter above w + κl and thus to have the
opportunity to apply for a simple job. Of course this term is proportional to the di￿erence Nll − Ul
and will be positive as soon as τl + b < w. Second, we have isolated the expected ￿ow of income that
a skilled worker enjoys at a cross-matching equilibrium since he can apply for simple jobs. This term
is proportional to Nhl − Uh and, here again, will be positive as soon as τl + b < w. Finally, skilled
workers have also the opportunity to apply for complex jobs. This gives them an excepted ￿ow of
income represented by the term proportional to Nhh−Nhl in equation (28). From the wage bargaining
equation, one may deduce that









Thus, the presence of search frictions in the labor market forces the utility of high-skilled workers to
be higher than high-skilled unemployed (Nhh > Uh). This excludes that both equalities Nhh = Nhl
and Nhl = Uh can be jointly satis￿ed.
These search frictions play di￿erent roles in the optimization of the various social optimum criteria
we can consider for the instruments at the government disposal. This implies that the maximum of
social surplus is associated to particular constraints on income distribution that limit the e￿ects of
redistributive policies.
Due to asymmetric information and frictions, the maximum in the Utilitarian objective function
does not correspond to the minimum of unemployment (with b ￿xed) as illustrated in Figure 13 (which
is an enlarged picture of the above lower-right plot). In this Figure, we have plotted the variation of the
total ￿ow of income rW with respect to the subsidy rate, keeping the unemployment bene￿t b constant.
The net lump-sum wage tax for high-skilled job is changed accordingly to balance the government
budget. We have also drawn the relative importance of the di￿erent expected ￿ow of income that
a worker may expect according to his skill. We observe that the minimum of unemployment under
incentive constraints (15) corresponds to the situation Nhl = Nhh, which is very di￿erent from the
Utilitarian criterion. Implementing low-skilled job subsidy policy aims at reducing unemployment but
it may induce some costs which move the equilibrium far away from the Utilitarian criterion. This
21Figure 13: Expected ￿ows of income
Budget balanced by high−wage tax rate changes
kappa













gap between utilities of an employed and an unemployed low−skill worker
gap between utilities of a downgraded and an unemployed high−skill worker
gap between utilities of an employed and a downgraded high−skill worker
maximum of overall utility flow
Table 2: Comparison of welfare levels
Nll Nhl Nhh Ul,c Ul,f Uh W
Calibrated values 16.22 22.775 22.995 6.8 15.51 22.452 19.924
Unemployed minimization 17.771 18.216 18.216 6.8 17.392 17.932 17.71
last one is maximum for a moderate low-skilled job subsidy, slightly larger in absolute value than the
current one in France.
The comparison of the welfare levels for each type of situations between the calibrated situation and
the minimum unemployment equilibrium in Table 2 shows that the second situation corresponds to a
deterioration of unemployed high-skilled worker situations and an improvement of those of low-skilled
persons out of classical unemployment. From a ￿scal point of view, this corresponds to a large subsidy
of low-skill jobs balanced by a large increase in net high-skilled wage taxes that reduces their return
and their number. On the labor market, this corresponds to a reduction of job opportunities for high-
skilled people in low-skilled positions and a decrease in low-skilled person unemployment. Reducing
their job opportunities implies a larger number of downgraded high-skilled workers that stay longer
in these positions. This may a￿ect the return of high-skilled degrees and create some disincentives to
invest in higher education.
5.3 Exogenous changes in the environment: A variation of productivity di￿eren-
tial
In second simulation exercise, we illustrate the implied changes in the equilibrium parameters induced
by an increase in the high-skilled productivity, the low-skilled productivity distribution remaining un-
changed. This change corresponds to a productivity shock that favors high-skilled workers, it modi￿es
all the equilibrium parameters and gives a room for maneuver to the government to change its subsidy-
tax scheme. Keeping to our way of analyzing these issues, we do not consider a possible change in
22the unemployment bene￿ts the government could implement since this measure could a￿ect voluntary
unemployment, but focus on the change in low-skilled job subsidies this productivity gain allows for.
First we must notice that the consequences of a biased productivity shock depend on the nature of
the relationship between low- and high-skilled job market. A higher value of sh induces a shift of the
high-skilled job market curve in Figure 2 to the right. When the equilibrium is associated to a crossing
of both curves in the decreasing part of the low-skilled job market one, a biased productivity shock
implies a new equilibrium position with a larger number of high-skilled job positions and a reduced
number of low-skilled job ones. The additional high-skilled wages tax the government can collect can
be used to increase the low-skilled job subsidies. This reduces, but does not o￿set, the magnitude of
this adverse change in the low-skilled job market. On the contrary, when the equilibrium corresponds
to a crossing of both curves in the complement area, a biased productivity shocks is associated to an
improvement in both low- and high-skilled job markets and a reduction in the frictional unemployment
and the number of downgraded high-skilled workers, reinforced by the possible increase in low-skilled
job subsidies that reduces the classical low-skilled unemployment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a formal set-up to analyze the impact of low-skilled job subsidies policies on
labour productivity. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled
workers, we show that the e￿ectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment are
decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by
an increasing number of downgraded high-skilled workers.
When the model is calibrated on French data, it is found that for ￿ve low-skilled workers leaving
classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded (although they might have been
previously unemployed).
In our model, di￿erences in productivity among workers are due to di￿erences in their initial ability,
but they can also be in￿uenced by the unemployment duration, the type of job occupied and their
career. Still, our model does not allow to analyze the impact of unemployment and downgrading on
workers’ skills accumulation. We provide a groundwork for future research comparing the e￿ectiveness
of training policies along the career with the ones based on low-skilled job subsidies. Importantly, as
underlines also by Oskamp and Snower (2006), these two policies may a￿ect initial educational choices
since returns of schooling may change.
237 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A : List of symbols
r instantaneous discount rate
G ￿xed public good spending
β parameter of the negotiation power of high-skilled workers in the Nash bargaining
φi,i = l,h percentage of i-type workers
x(s) probability density of low-skilled worker output
X(s) cumulative density of low-skilled worker output
s upper bound of the support of low-skilled worker output
sh high-skilled worker output
δi,i = l,h exogenous ￿ow rate of termination of employment
λi,i = l,h constant of the i-type matching function
ci,i = l,h cost of posting a i-type vacancy
cr search cost (=0 in the text)
pi,i = l,h probability for an unemployed to move into a i-type job
qi,i = l,h probability to ￿ll a i-type vacancy
τh net lump-sum wage tax for high-skilled jobs
τl lump-sum wage tax for low-skilled jobs
κl low-skilled job tax
b unemployment bene￿t
w minimum wage
wh high-skilled worker wage
Vi,i = l,h discounted value of a vacancy of type i
Ui,i = l,h discounted value of being unemployed (frictional unemployment)
Ue
l discounted value of being excluded from the job market
Ni,j,i,j = l,h discounted value of being employed for a i-type worker in a j-type ￿rm
Ji,j,i,j = l,h discounted value of a j job ￿lled by i-type worker
ei,j,i,j = l,h percentage of i-type workers employed in j-type jobs
ui,i = l,h percentage of i-type unemployed
ul,c,ul,v,ul,f percentage of classical, voluntary and frictional
unemployed low-skilled people (calibration section)
7.2 Appendix B : Proofs
7.2.1 Unemployment and employment levels.
At the cross-matching equilibrium satisfying inequalities (15), the ￿ow equilibrium conditions for each
state become:
pluh = (ph + δl)ehl
plul (s) = δlell (s)




























Proposition 1 states the range of values of the arrival rate ph that allow for positive arrival rates ph
and pl, and that satisfy incentives constraints Nhh ≥ Nhl ≥ Uh.
Let introduce the following notations
Sl = w − (τl + b)
Sh = sh − (τh + b)
Three cases have to be considered






Sh − Sl ≤
(r + δh + βph)ch
(1 − β)Qh(ph)
≤ Sh
• Sh − Sl < 0 and r + δh − β(r + δl) ≤ 0: then p
h and ¯ ph are de￿ned by
(Sh − Sl)(r + δh + βph)
r + δh − β (r + δl)
≤
(r + δh + βph)ch
(1 − β)Qh(ph)
≤ Sh
• Sh − Sl ≥ 0 and r + δh − β(r + δl) > 0: then p
h and ¯ ph are de￿ned by
Sh − Sl ≤





(Sh − Sl)(r + δh + βph)
r + δh − β (r + δl)

7.2.3 Uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium.
Note ￿rst that uniqueness is trivial if Sl = 0. Therefore, we focus on the case Sl > 0. The free-entry
condition for high-skilled jobs allows us to de￿ne function Pl
pl = Pl (ph) ≡ (r + δl + ph)
Sh − (r + δh + βph)
ch
(1−β)Qh(ph)
(r + δh + βph)
ch
(1−β)Qh(ph) − (Sh − Sl)








¯ s − w − κl
where
γ = Γ(ph) ≡
φh





δl + Pl (ph)
δl + Pl (ph) + ph
.
Let us de￿ne
˜ H (ph) ≡
Ql (Pl (ph))











¯ s − w − κl





r + δl + ph




























≥ 0 for ph ∈ I, then P0
l is also negative on this interval. This implies that
Γ0 is also negative at the equilibrium value of the arrival rate ph and the result immediately follows.
Let now prove that (31) is a su￿cient condition for uniqueness. The ￿rst-order derivative of
Ql(Pl(ph))
r+δl+ph has the same sign as
−1





















−(r + δl + ph)P0
l
Pl
= − 1 +

















g (ph) − (Sh − Sl)
+
1
Sh − g (ph)

and
g (ph) ≡ (r + δh + βph)
ch
(1 − β)Qh (ph)
.






≥ 0 is equivalent to
(r + δl + ph)βch
(1 − β)Qh (ph)

1
g (ph) − (Sh − Sl)
+
1



















From the inequality (18) in Proposition 1, we deduce
g (ph) − (Sh − Sl) ≤
(r + δl + ph)βch
(1 − β)Qh (ph)
which implies that LHS in (32) is higher than
Sl
Sh − g (ph)






≥ 0 to be satis￿ed.
7.2.4 Analysis of pc
l,l (ph):
Solutions of (26) are the roots of the following second order polynomial
[1 + b(ph)]p2







r + δl + ph
b(ph) =
φhδh (δl + ph)
(1 − X (κl + w))φlδl (δh + ph)
c(ph) = (δl + ph) + [δl − a(ph)]b(ph) − ps
l (κl)
d(ph) = −a(ph)b(ph)δl − ps
l (κl)(δl + ph)
For positive values of ph, since d(ph) < 0, the discriminant ∆ = c(ph)
2−4[1 + b(ph)]d(ph) is positive.





2 − 4d(ph)(1 + b(ph))
2(1 + b(ph))
Simple algebraic manipulations show that pl,− is negative, so we set pc
l,l (ph) = pl,+.
267.3 Appendix C : Details of the calibration
We detail the calibration procedure. We ￿rst present some parameter values we derived from already
available statistics we picked in various works and then list the set of equations we used to calibrate
the remaining parameters.
We decompose the wage cost into a labor contribution paid by the ￿rm and by the employee and
a remainder. In case of low-skilled worker, this remainder corresponds to wl that we set equal to 1 by
convention (wl = w = 1). The labor market contribution paid by the employee is the unemployment
bene￿t contribution that amounts to 0.0227. For sake of simplicity, we assume that low-skilled workers
do not paid direct income tax10, so that τl = 0.0227. The labor market contribution paid by employers
is equal to the net sum of the unemployment bene￿t contribution and the subsidies on low-skilled jobs.
We average this subsidy available for job paid between the minimum wage and 1.3 minimum wage we
assume to be low-skilled position. This should lead to an over-evaluation as some high-skilled workers
earn less than 1.3 minimum wage. We obtain that κl = −0.0218. Turning to high-skilled workers, a
similar de￿nition of the wage cost gives wh = 1.39. We then compute the amount of income tax paid
on average by the 70% richest households that we add to the unemployment bene￿t contribution. This
gives τh = 0.143. We then set b equal to the monthly amount per capita paid by Social Security and
the government by way of unemployment bene￿ts and ￿R.M.I.￿ bene￿ts : b = 0.34 and compute the
￿government budget￿ which gives us G = 0.0098. Numerous empirical studies on the bargaining power
of workers allow us to reasonably pick the value β = 0.25. We set r = 0.05 on a yearly basis.










pl + ph + δl
(34)
From Leclair and Roux (2004), we get the share (Pls = 0.269) of low-skilled jobs and (Phs = 0.164) of
high-skilled jobs that last less than one year. In the steady state of our model, we have












Equation (35) gives δh = 0.1791 and then (33) ph = 1.077, it follows from (36) that δl = 0.2341 and
from (34) that pl = 0.6136 which implies that ul,f = 0.085 and ul,v + ul,c = 0.055.
The remaining deep parameters we have to calibrate are σ, ul,c, ch, cl, cr, sh, s, a1, a2, λh and λl.
We set σ = 0.5 and consider a Cobb-Douglas matching function:
mi(θi) = λi(θi)1/2 for i = l,h
First, we notice that based on the set of available equations (free-entry and ￿ow equilibrium conditions)
and without additional information on vacancies, only sh, ch/λ2
h and cl/λ2
l can be identi￿ed, which
means that we have to calibrate seven parameters at most. Second, the cross-matching equilibrium we
consider exists when inequalities (15) are satis￿ed, which induces numerous constraints on their values.
Third, we have at our disposal two free-entry conditions (one for each job market), a wage bargaining
equation, ell equation
ell =
pl (φl − ul,v)
pl + δl
(1 − X (κl + w))
=









10About one half of French households do not pay income taxes.
27We therefore need additional information. Drawing on CrØpon et al. (2002), we compute an estimate























Moreover, drawing on the various studies (CrØpon and Deplatz (2001), Laroque and SalaniØ (2000))
on the job creations induced by the subsidies on low-skilled jobs implemented between 1992 and 1997
(∆κl = −0.0756), we set that that this subsidy contributes to the creation of 450 000 jobs. We then
have six non-linear equations and three inequalities to determine the seven parameters ml, mh, sh, s,
uc,l, a1 and a2. Technically speaking, we still need additional information but at this stage the solution
set might already be empty. The natural additional information might be given by vacancy statistics,
but we did not ￿nd any usable statistic in this area. We then proceed as follows. Determining the sets
of parameter values that satisfy the set of inequality constraints and the above equations, we observe
that some of these sets are very small intervals. We then select the middle of the interval as the value
of the parameter. We therefore proceed in a second step to a sensitivity analysis to the selected choice
to analyze the robustness of our qualitative conclusions.
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